The latest summit of the four-nation Quad, which brought together the leaders of Australia, India, Japan and the US, ended over the weekend with agreements to extend cooperation in areas varying from fighting cervical cancer and ensuring cybersecurity to joint development of port infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific, the creation of an air-logistics network and a group effort to keep chip supplies secure.
This reflects a broad agenda, with the well-being of the region’s people at its heart. Yet, although no official mention was made of China, the summit’s outcome had tell-tale signs of the breath of a dragon in the room.
For the past half decade or more, ever since this Quadrilateral Security Dialogue formally adopted the goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific region, the threat foreseen has been clear: Beijing’s advancing appetite for power projection across the eastern hemisphere.
It had once seemed that the Quad would test India’s professed neutrality in geopolitics. But, to New Delhi’s credit, its embrace of the group has been nuanced enough for that resolve to be held firm.
Nobody should fret about a military alliance in the making. The Quad has no pact of mutual defence. This is in harmony with India’s insistence on strategic autonomy and full control of its armed forces.
“We are not against anyone,” stated Prime Minister Narendra Modi. “We all support a rules-based international order, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and peaceful resolution of all issues.” On an item-wise perusal, the Quad has civilian aims like calamity relief and disease prevention.
Yet, the message for Beijing is clear: that the Quad is here to stay. That US President Joe Biden was heard speaking of China’s Xi Jinping “looking to buy himself some diplomatic space” to “focus on domestic economic challenges” would not have escaped Beijing’s attention either.
The agreements signed include a maritime training initiative, a port-resilience effort and a plan to develop a logistical network in pursuit of airlift capacity for response to natural disasters.
These add up to collaboration on dual-use capabilities. All the better, one could say, for the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to be upheld and shipping lanes not to be disrupted.
Still, what’s unknown at this juncture is the Quad’s potency as a China deterrent. Apart from Taiwan, a crucial chip-maker that Beijing has been eyeing for historical reasons, Japan and the Philippines have faced the stirring dragon’s heat in recent years.
Militarily, the US may be relying on its Aukus plan of arming Australia for stability in the Far East, but boosted Quad capacity across a wider expanse of this hemisphere could potentially help stare down Chinese misadventures.
India may not be ready to join the wars of others, as a matter of democratic sovereignty, but will surely act to secure its vital interests. It makes sense for New Delhi to keep our options open on making common cause with other powers should any threat materialize.
After the Galwan clashes of 2020, friction with China has risen sharply. While the Quad focuses on maritime aspects of security, we cannot afford to slacken on fortifying the country along its land borders.
Indeed, we must accelerate the reorientation of our armed forces into theatre commands, so that all three wings of combat can respond jointly to aggression with due operational efficiency. Regardless of partnerships, India’s defence, ultimately, will be in Indian hands. That’s how it should be.
