America is rapidly losing the ability to deter China in the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere due to a weak defense industrial base. The Trump administration can revitalize this base by increasing procurement funds, making defense systems critical for warfighting and deterrence in Asia a priority, and cutting excessive contracting regulations.
This month, my colleagues and I led members of the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party in a simulation of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The goal was to understand how the U.S. defense industrial base would perform in a protracted war with China and to assess the implications for deterrence. The results weren’t reassuring.
The simulation began with a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan in 2026. Both sides suffered heavy losses, but the U.S. defense industrial base was severely stressed. The U.S. military spent its entire inventory of Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles by the end of the first week and ran out of Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range missiles after a month. Taiwan used up its entire inventory of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles after a week. It would be very difficult to sustain a fight without these weapons.
We also found that the U.S. faces significant supply-chain, workforce and contracting challenges. It has too few solid rocket motors, processor assemblies, castings, ball bearings and forgings. These shortages would drastically limit replacement of weapons systems used or destroyed in a conflict. The U.S. also relies on China for advanced battery parts and key raw materials, which could be cut off in a war.
A shortage of engineers, electricians, pipefitters, shipfitters and metalworkers at U.S. factories and shipyards would also cripple the country’s ability to win a protracted war. These challenges are already delaying the construction of frigates, submarines, destroyers and other ships.
Reversing these trends will take time. It takes roughly two years to produce critical munitions like the missile systems necessary to support Taiwan in a conflict with China. It could take several years for U.S defense companies to build new factories, since it takes time to buy property and insurance, obtain permits and build infrastructure.
It also won’t be cheap. The U.S. spends roughly 3% of its gross domestic product on defense. This won’t cut it in today’s landscape where both China and Russia are on a wartime footing and collaborating with Iran, North Korea and other countries.
The Pentagon needs more funding, which should be directed toward nuclear-powered submarines, ships, unmanned vehicles, long-range missiles and other equipment key to deterrence and warfighting in the Indo-Pacific. During the Reagan administration, the U.S. defense budget hovered around 6% of GDP to deal with the Soviet threat. Given how competitive the international landscape is today, the U.S. should aim for a defense budget somewhere between 4% and 6% of GDP.
The U.S. also needs to cut defense-contracting regulations to make it easier for commercial firms, including start-ups, to work with the Pentagon. The U.S. has some of the most innovative companies in unmanned systems, sensors and artificial intelligence. But many of their products never make it from prototype to contract because Defense Department acquisition processes are often prohibitively long and burdensome.
Fortunately, there is a growing bipartisan consensus that the U.S. needs to revitalize its defense industrial base. At our simulation, both Select Committee Chairman John Moolenaar and Ranking Member Raja Krishnamoorthi agreed that the country needs to make changes quickly or risk a disastrous war.
The clock is ticking. Xi Jinping has indicated that he would like his military to be prepared for a war with the U.S. in 2027, halfway through the Trump administration. Will America be ready?
Mr. Jones is president of the defense and security department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
